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Abstract 
We analyze the effects of EU adoption of a Sky Trust (Barnes and Breslow 2003) on the income 
distribution of Hungary, a lower-middle income EU member.  We use plausible parameters for an EU 
carbon charge and revenue recycling system, input-output data to track the effect of a carbon charge on 
commodity prices, and household consumption survey data to examine the effect on expenditure by 
decile.  We find that the carbon-charge revenue collection is nearly flat with respect to income.  
Combined with Sky Trust revenue recycling, the net effect on income distribution is moderately 
progressive.  For a Sky Trust structure that would significantly increase the likelihood of the EU 
meeting Stern Review and IPCC greenhouse gas reduction targets, households in the top decile of the 
Hungarian income distribution would see incomes fall by 859 USD, or 4.4 percent.  Households in the 
lowest decile of the Hungarian income distribution would see household budgets rise by 498 USD, or 
11.4 percent.  At the median household income, the effect is small but positive. 
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Introduction:  The Promise and Incidence of the Sky Trust 
 
The international policy response to global warming is likely to involve incentive-based pollution 
control strategies, such as the establishment of carbon fees or carbon permits.  Incentive-based 
pollution control has established a track record of efficiently reducing airborne emissions in specific 
national implementations, e.g., the introduction of tradable sulfur-dioxide emission permits in the U.S.  
under the Clean Air Act of 1990.  Moreover, the complexity of managing carbon-emission reduction 
across hundreds of polities and billions of carbon users requires a transparent, implementable policy.  
Charging a fee for the introduction of fossil fuels into the national economy creates a manageable, 
well-defined gateway where the root source of greenhouse gas emissions can be priced to reflect more 
fully their social cost. 
 
A difficulty with carbon charges, as with many consumption taxes, is that they tend to be regressive.  In 
many industrialized countries, across the income distribution carbon use increases less than 
proportionately with consumption which, in turn, increases less than proportionately with income.  
Carbon charges that will actually reduce carbon emissions are likely to be quite substantial.  With 
reasonably competitive markets and low elasticity of consumer demand, the cost of carbon charges is 
largely built into the final price consumers pay for products.  With carbon intensity by income as 
described above, the incidence of carbon charges is regressive. 
 
The Sky Trust proposed by Barnes and Breslow (2003) provides a straightforward way to offset the 
regressiveness of carbon charges while enjoying their efficiency advantages in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions .  The Sky Trust would recycle the revenues collected in the charge system on an equal per-
capita basis.  Barnes and Breslow highlight three main advantages to the Sky Trust: 
 
1. The fee system achieves the efficiency of incentive-based regulation; 
2. The trust establishes the carbon-absorptive capacity of the atmosphere as a commons, natural 
wealth held collectively and equally, and implements the polluter-pays principle, in contrast to 
alternative property assignment, e.g., assigning the right to pollute to current polluters 
(“grandfathering”); and 
3. The progressive per capita distribution offsets the regressivity of fee collection on the revenue 
side. 
 
Barnes and Breslow compute a distributional analysis for a U.S. Sky Trust with plausible parameters.  
They find significant regressivity on the pay-in side which is more than fully offset by progressivity on 
the pay-out side.  In net, households in the lowest decile of the U.S. income distribution would see 
incomes rise by 354 USD, or 5.1 percent.  Households in the top decile of the U.S. income distribution 
would see incomes fall by 1,378 USD, or -0.9 percent (Barnes and Breslow 2003).   
 
Brenner, Riddle, and Boyce (2005) undertake a distributional analysis for a Sky Trust in China.  Among 
the interesting findings for the Chinese Sky Trust are: (1) the progressivity of the revenue collection as 
well as the revenue recycling; and (2) the enormous difference between rural and urban incidence.  In 
rural China 60 to 90 percent of household energy consumption comes from biomass.  Also, cash 
incomes and expenditure in rural China are extremely low.  Both of these factors make the incidence of 
the carbon charge progressive with respect to income.  The net effect of the Sky Trust on rural poverty 
is fairly dramatic; rural poverty falls more than 4 percentage points, from 19.1 to 14.9 percent (Brenner 
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et al.). 
 
In this note, we analyze the distributional implications for the Republic of Hungary of European Union 
(EU) adoption of a Sky Trust.  Hungary joined the European Union in May 2004 with nine other 
accession states.  Although Hungary is among the most prosperous of the accession states, its 2005 per-
capita income of 17,200 USD (PPP) was only 60 percent of overall EU per capita income (OECD 
2006).  Hungary thus represents a small, open-economy, energy-importing middle-income country.  Its 
rank in the lower-middle strata of both the European Union and the OECD make it a useful test case for 
Sky Trust analysis. 
 
First we propose reasonable parameters for an EU Sky Trust.  Next, we estimate the effect on consumer 
prices of adoption of the Sky Trust.  Then, we compute for Hungary the incidence across the income 
distribution of the two components of the Sky Trust, pay-in for carbon use and pay-out on a per 
household basis, and its net incidence across the income distribution. 
 
 
The EU Sky Trust:  One Carbon Price, Many Sky Trusts 
 
We suppose the adoption by the EU of a single rate for the introduction carbon fuels with national 
administration, that is, the collection of fees and recycling of revenue, carried out at the national level.  
In principle, there is no minimum size or population threshold for a Sky Trust region.  However, small-
scale Sky Trusts may raise the specter of reduced competitiveness for the participating regions because 
the cost of energy will be higher.  Because Hungary is a small, open economy, an exclusively 
Hungarian Sky Trust would face severe constraints with respect to changing the relative prices of 
imports and domestically-produced carbon-based goods.  Previous analysis of Sky Trust incidence has 
examined the effects in large economies with relatively low import penetration, namely the United 
States (Barnes and Breslow) and China (Brenner et al.).  By positing EU-wide adoption of a single per-
unit carbon charge, we sidestep the problem of import-constrained domestic prices.   
 
Hungary is a small country, and with the exception of 10 percent of its energy consumption provided 
by a single nuclear power plant, Hungary meets almost all of its energy requirement with imported 
fossil fuels (Hungarian Ministry for Environment 2001).  Reductions in its annual emissions of 56.8 
million tons of carbon dioxide emissions will have little effect on global greenhouse gas 
concentrations.  After the late-1989 transition from state socialism to a predominantly market economy, 
the national economy contracted sharply for several years with many firm closures in heavy industry,  
leaving Hungary currently 20 percent below its 1990 emission level (OECD 2006), the basis of its 
Kyoto Protocol target.  Although Hungary has no obligation under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon 
emissions further, its emissions have risen since the late 1990's.  Also, Hungary has one of the least 
carbon-efficient economies in the OECD.  Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia have the 
worst performance in the EU in terms of carbon dioxide emissions per GDP.  In any case, stricter 
carbon control measures by the European Union will likely be necessary to achieve the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or Stern Review targets for climate stabilization in the 
mid-21st century.   
 
Most significantly for the realism of our analysis, the posited framework is consistent with the 
administrative structure of the EU.  The EU is reasonably likely to establish a unified approach to 
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greenhouse-gas reduction, but implementation will almost certainly occur at the country level.  We 
could also consider the possibility that there will be supplementary payments to poorer EU members to 
compensate for the hardship of meeting emissions targets. 
 
We consider a Sky Trust with a 200 USD per metric ton of carbon (or 54.5 USD per mT of CO2) charge 
for the introduction of fossil fuels into each national economy.  The charge would be applied at the 
pipehead, the mine entrance, the border, or the port with intra-EU invoicing to offset taxes applied to 
transshipments.  The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2000) reports that for the entire U.S. economy, 
there would be only 2,000 collection points. Assuming a similar number for the European Union, the 
carbon-charge system could be relatively cheap to administer.  Another indicator of the likely low cost 
of collection is that in the U.S., current federal costs for petroleum taxes and excise duties range from 
0.12 to 0.25 percent of revenue (Brenner et al.). 
 
The charge of 200 USD/ton carbon is based on the midpoint of estimates in Barnes and Breslow based 
on reasonable assumptions about the price elasticity of demand for embedded carbon of the charge 
required to get the U.S. to meet its proposed obligation under the Kyoto Protocol.  There is substantial 
variation across the studies in the level of the carbon charge, in part because there is substantial 
disagreement about the level of charges necessary to meet various carbon-reduction targets.  For 
example, Parry (2002) claims that the United States can meet its initial Kyoto target (a reduction of 
emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2010) with carbon charges between 50 USD and 150 USD 
per ton.  A survey of 11 studies quoted in Barnes and Breslow, report a range from 20 USD to 400 USD 
per ton.  Barnes and Breslow use alternative values of 83 USD , 191 USD, and 296 USD  for their 
analysis, with the middle figure as the basis of the more detailed simulations.   
 
 
Carbon Charges Passing Through 
 
We assume competitive markets so that the charge is entirely passed through to consumers.  For 
computational ease, we do not consider changes in demand induced by the carbon charge, and in 
particular, we ignore differences in carbon-demand elasticity across the income distribution.  Although 
the assumption of no consumption response may seem odd for an analysis of a tax that is intended and 
expected to alter consumer behavior, it follows common practice (Metcalf 1999, Barnes and Breslow 
2003, and Brenner et al. 2006).  In any case, the assumption: (1) may result in overestimation of the 
overall revenue from the carbon charge because the tax base will be smaller if the elasticity is non-zero; 
(2) yields results equivalent to applying a higher per-unit charge with negative demand elasticity; and 
(3) may result in overestimation of the regressivity of the carbon charge because poor households 
appear to substitute more from high-priced to low-priced goods. 
 
The introduction of a carbon charge will increase prices in the economy, beginning with the price of 
carbon.  Commodity-specific price increases can be estimated using input-output tables to track fuels 
from their source industry, through processing in intermediate industries to the final consumption goods 
in which the fuel is embedded.  In our analysis, we rely on the input-output data from Metcalf (1999), 
which are based on the production technology of the U.S. economy, as a reasonable proxy for the 
computation of carbon content in final goods in the EU.  To the extent that EU production is somewhat 
less energy-intensive that is U.S. production (OECD 2006), we may overestimate the effect on final-
good prices of an increase in energy prices.   
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Tabulations of a household expenditure survey are used to identify the typical household consumption 
bundle by decile.  We combine the commodity-specific price increases induced by carbon charges with 
commodity-specific consumption data by deciles of household income.  For the distributional analysis 
we estimate the increased cost of the total consumption bundle by income deciles.  Progressivity, or 
regressivity, depends on the extent to which carbon consumption increases less or more than 
proportionately with income.   Following Brenner et al. (2005), we deduct 1 percent in estimated 
administrative cost, and distribute the entire remaining fund on an equal basis.  We then aggregate the 
remaining carbon-charge revenue and examine the effect of distributing all of the revenue on an equal 
basis.  The Sky Trust pay-out should in principle deliver equal per-person benefits, but because of 
economies of scale in households, the most egalitarian payout is not necessarily equal per capita.  In the 
United States, high income households on average have more members than do poor households and 
hence per-capita payout would skew the per-household payout slightly upward.  In any case, we lack 
household composition data by expenditure decile for Hungary.  Whether the payout is per-capita as in 
Barnes and Breslow or per-household as in our simulation for Hungary, the pay-out of the Sky Trust is 
clearly progressive and will at least partly offset any regressivity in the pay-in. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The commodity-specific price-increase estimates are taken from Metcalf's analysis of the U.S. 
economy.  Consumption bundles by income decile are published by the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office and are based on a household survey employing expenditure diaries. 
 
The commodity categories in the published Hungarian data imperfectly match the commodity 
categories in Metcalf (1999).  In Table 1, we group Metcalf's commodity categories to match the 
categories of the published Hungarian data as closely as possible.  Column 1 of Table 1 reprints in 
normal type the commodity categories and and Column 2 the estimated price increases of Metcalf 
Table 3.  The bold-faced rows in Column 1 of Table 1 collapses Metcalf's categories to match the 
published Hungarian consumption data.  In the boldfaced rows of Column 2, we take simple averages 
of all the Metcalf-estimated price increase within the collapsed groups.1  Because Metcalf hypothesizes 
a 40 USD/ton carbon charge in 1994 dollars and our analysis calls for a 200 USD per ton carbon charge 
in current dollars, we multiply the price increases by a factor of 3.68, which accounts for both inflation 
and the higher charge.  The implied price increases are reported in Column 3.   
 
Column 4 reports the share that the commodity group represents in the budget of the average 
Hungarian household.  Column 5 reports the implied increase in expenditure, as a share of total 
expenditure for the average Hungarian household, induced by the 200 USD/ton carbon charge. 
 
 
                                                 
1  For example, we constitute the “Clothing” category, which appears in the Hungarian data, from “Clothing and 
shoes,” “Clothing services,” “Jewelry and watches,” and “Toilet articles and preparations” in Metcalf Table 3.  The price 
increases for these four categories of 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.7%, and 0.8% are averaged to 0.70%, reported in Column 2 for the 
overall “Clothing” category.   Perhaps the most egregious of these square-peg-round-hole matchings is the category 
“Transportation and communication.”  The former is strongly affected by the carbon tax while the latter is minimally 
affected. 
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Results 
 
Following the method developed in Metcalf (1999) and extrapolating from the analysis of pass-through 
to consumer prices in the CBO (2000) report, we estimate that the 200 USD/ton charge would cause an 
overall one-time increase in consumer prices of 11 percent.  Price increases are, not surprisingly, 
heavily concentrated in fuel-intensive areas of the economy. 
 
The top panel of Table 2 shows the consumption bundle of Hungarian households, by decile of 
expenditure.  Table 2 refers entirely to expenditure rather than income.  An advantage of this focus is 
that a snapshot of annual expenditure may be a better proxy for permanent income than is a snapshot of 
annual income.  A significant drawback of measuring expenditure rather than income is that 
expenditure omits savings, a category that is likely skewed towards the richest range of the income 
distribution.  The use of expenditure in lieu of income may understate both the regressivity of the 
carbon charge and the progressivity of the Sky Trust dividend. 
 
Consumption patterns across the Hungarian income distribution follow expected patterns of 
consumption of necessities and luxuries across income deciles.  For example, while total expenditure 
increases by a factor of 4.5, from 1,646 USD/year in the lowest decile to 7,388 USD/year in the top 
decile, food expenditure increases only 2.5 times.  In the most fuel-intensive category, maintenance of 
dwellings, expenditure increases three times from the lowest to highest income deciles.  Spending on 
every category is higher in the richer deciles; rich households spend more in absolute terms on carbon-
intensive and less carbon-intensive categories.  
 
The middle panel of Table 2 shows the implied increase in expenditure by commodity category and 
decile caused by the introduction of a carbon charge.  The categories with substantial carbon-charge 
effects are maintenance of dwellings and transportation and communication, both of which are both 
large expenditure categories and fuel-intensive, and food, which is simply a large expenditure category.  
Expenditure on maintenance of dwellings increases by 40 percent with the introduction of the carbon 
tax. 
 
The bottom panel of Table 2 summarizes the effect of  the Sky Trust on household budgets.  As in the 
United States (Barnes and Breslow 2003), and unlike China (Brenner et al 2007), the carbon charge 
itself has a somewhat regressive incidence in Hungary.  With a charge of 507 USD, representing 
somewhat more than two tons of carbon consumption, the carbon charge absorbs almost 12 percent of 
the household budget in the poorest decile. Even at the seventh decile, the carbon charge is still above 
11 percent of expenditure.  Although the absolute charge increases to almost 1,900 USD, the share 
drops to 9.5 percent of expenditure in the richest decile.  The decline in share occurs primarily in the 
eighth, ninth, and tenth deciles.  The pattern implies that carbon use increases more or less 
proportionately with income through the poorer seventy percent of the income distribution.  Only 
among the richest third of households does the proportion of spending in the less carbon-intensive 
categories increase sharply.   
 
Because the Sky Trust carbon charge represents a significant share household income, 11 percent for 
the median household, the 1,005 USD/year Sky Trust dividend, which represents an equal distribution 
to all  households of the Sky Trust revenue less the cost of administration, also has a substantial impact 
on household budgets.  At the median, the Sky Trust dividend returns a sum to households equal to 
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about 12 percent of household expenditure.  For the poor tenth of households, the Sky Trust dividend 
increases the household budget by almost one quarter.   
 
The last two lines of Table 2 report the net incidence of the Sky Trust for Hungary.  The richest 
households make a net payment of  859 USD per year, which represents a 4.4 percent decrease in the 
available budget.  For the poorest households, the Sky Trust has a substantial net positive effect, 
increasing household budgets by more than 11 percent.  At the median, the Sky Trust has a modest 
positive effect on the household budget, with a net return of between 40 and 95 USD per year, 
representing a positive transfer of slightly less than one percent of expenditure.  With a positive impacts 
through the sixth decile, we observe that the majority of Hungarian households are net beneficiaries. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
An important problem for Sky Trust analysis is that this type of incidence analysis may miss variation 
in the impact within income deciles.  For example, in the United States the rural poor may drive long 
distances and may be particularly affected by carbon charges.  In the United States there may also be 
sharp regional differences in incidence based on climate (reliance on air conditioning in the Sunbelt 
and reliance on heating fuels in the north).  Not all people with the same income will pay equally into 
the Sky Trust, and some of the variation within income tranches may be for reasons that are at least 
partly beyond individual control, e.g., region of residence or residential heat source. 
 
Policy analyses of previous Sky Trust proposals have been national in scope, and large countries have 
been the object of study (Barnes and Breslow 2003 and Brenner et al. 2005).  Our analysis examines an 
EU-wide Sky Trust with national administration.  An important direction for further research on Sky 
Trusts in small countries would direct attention to drags on competitiveness. 
 
Although we offer these several notes of caution with respect to interpreting the incidence estimates, 
the implied effect of the EU Sky Trust on the income distribution is quite favorable for the prospect of 
policy adoption.  As a matter of political popularity, the Sky Trust for Hungary generates a positive net 
benefit for at least 60 percent of the population, which should position it favorably for adoption.  As a 
matter of equity, the Sky Trust both implements the polluter-pay principle and reduces inequality in an 
era of growing inequality.  As a matter of economic efficiency, the Sky Trust can play an important role 
in creating incentives for efficiency in the carbon-inefficient former State Socialist economies. 
 
 
 
8 
References 
 
Peter Barnes and Marc Breslow “The Sky Trust: The Battle for Atmospheric Scarcity Rent” in Natural 
Assets: Democratizing Environmental Ownership. Edited by James K. Boyce and Barry G. Shelley. 
Island Press, 2003. 
 
Mark Brenner, Matthew Riddle, and James K. Boyce.  “A Chinese Sky Trust? Distributional Impacts of 
Carbon Charges and Revenue Recycling in China.” Political Economy Research Institute Working 
Paper. June 2005. 
 
Congressional Budget Office.  Who Gains and Who Pays under Carbon-Allowance Trading?  The 
Distributional Effects of Alternative Policy Designs. June 2000. 
 
Hungarian Ministry for Environment.  Main Environmental Indicators of Hungary, 2001. 
 
Gilbert E. Metcalf. “A Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms.” National Tax Journal LII(4). 
December 1999. 
 
Ian W. H. Parry.  “Are Tradable Emissions Permits a Good Idea?”  Resources for the Future Issues 
Brief 02-33, 2002. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  OECD in Figures 2006-2007. 
2006
9 
10 
 
 
 
 
Notes
Sources: The normal typeface rows, including the price increases induced by  a 
40 USD/ton carbon tax  are reprinted from Metcalf (1999) Table 3.
The commodit ies categories and Average Budget  Shares in the boldface rows are 
reported by the Hungarian Central Stat ist ical Office.
In the boldfaced rows, the price increases induced by  a 40 USD/ton carbon tax
are a simple average of Metcalf (1999) increases for the commodity  category.
The price increases induced by  a 200 (2006) USD/ton carbon tax  are 3.68 t imes larger than
for a 40 (1994) USD/ton carbon tax.
The implied expenditure increase reports the product  of columns 3 and 4, 
the increase in category  expenditure as a share of average household expenditure.
Table  1 : Percent  price  increases induced by ca rbon charge ,  by consumpt ion ca tegory
Price Increase Average Implied
by Carbon Charge Budget Expenditure
Categories 40 USD/ton 200 USD/ton Share Increase
(1994 dol lars) (2006 dollars)
Food off-premise 0.9%
Food on-premise 0.5%
Food furnish d employees 1.0%
Food 0 .80% 2.94% 22 .8% 0 .67%
Tobacco products 0.4%
Alcohol off-premise 0.8%
Alcohol on-premis 0.5%
Beverages, tobacco 0 .57% 2.08% 4 .9% 0 .10%
Clothing and shoes 0.8%
Clothing serv ices 0.5%
Jewelry  and watches 0.7%
0.8%
0 .70% 2.57% 4 .8% 0 .12%
0.2%
0.5%
0 .35% 1.29% 5 .3% 0 .07%
0.8%
0.9%
en 0.5%
11.6%
0.6%
0.3%
1.9%
e
Toilet  art icles and preparat ions
Clothing
Tenant-occupied nonfarm dwell ings—rent
Other rented lodging
Investment  on housing
New and used motor vehicles
Tires, tubes, accessories,  and other parts
Repair, greasing, washing, parking, storage, r
Gasoline and oil
Bridge, tunnel, ferry , and road tol ls
Auto insurance
Mass t ransit  systems
Taxicab, rai lway, bus, and other t ravel expens s 1.9%
1.9%
0.3%
2 .07% 7.61% 20 .6% 1 .57%
12.0%
19.6%
0.6%
12.1%
11 .08% 40.71% 19 .1% 7 .78%
0.5%
0.5%
1.0%
0.3%
0.3%
0 .52% 1.91% 6 .1% 0 .12%
0.8%
t 0.0%
p
Airl ine fares
Telephone and telegraph
Transporta t ion,  communica t ion
Electricity
Natural gas
Water and other sanitary  serv ices
Fuel oi l and coal
M aintenance  of  dw ellings
Medical care
Barbershops, beauty parlors, health clubs
Domest ic serv ice, other household operat ion
Business serv ices
Expense of handling l i fe insurance
Hea lth,  pe rsona l care
Furniture and durable household equipment
Nondurable household supplies and equipmen
Housekeeping, household equipment  &  a p 0 .40% 1.47% 5 .0% 0 .07%
0.7%
s, 0.8%
0.7%
0.5%
0.5%
0 .64% 2.35% 8 .1% 0 .19%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0 .50% 1.84% 3 .3% 0 .06%
Books and maps
Magazines, newspapers, other nondurable toy
Recreat ion and sports equipment
Other recreat ion serv ices
Pari-mutuel net  receipts
Culture ,  recrea t ion,  ente rta inment
Higher educat ion
Nursery, elementary , and secondary educat ion
Other educat ion serv ices
Religious and welfare act iv i t ies
Other expenditure
 
Table  2 : The  Sky Trust  in Hungary
Top Pa ne l: Household Expenditure  by Consumpt ion Ca tegory and Household Decile
In 2006 USD
Deciles of Household Expenditure
Consumpt ion Categories 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Food $1,327 $1,596 $1,790 $1,930 $2,086 $2,168 $2,298 $2,437 $2,732 $3,259
Beverages, tobacco $289 $347 $350 $400 $441 $430 $472 $507 $586 $814
Clothing $228 $296 $346 $366 $368 $387 $421 $536 $602 $1,033
Maintenance of dwell ings $974 $1,246 $1,462 $1,517 $1,671 $1,784 $1,943 $2,115 $2,383 $3,069
Housekeeping, household equipment  & $189 $255 $306 $345 $412 $422 $488 $588 $732 $974
Health, personal care $220 $313 $377 $446 $548 $568 $663 $719 $837 $1,104
Transportat ion, communicat ion $599 $1,080 $1,163 $1,383 $1,542 $1,559 $1,949 $2,334 $3,080 $4,919
Culture, recreat ion, entertainment $258 $359 $460 $480 $601 $632 $669 $913 $1,182 $2,131
Other expenditure $72 $136 $195 $227 $206 $250 $282 $362 $536 $881
Investment on housing $214 $237 $511 $269 $296 $396 $411 $595 $639 $1,435
Total Expenditure $4,371 $5,865 $6,960 $7,362 $8,171 $8,596 $9,596 $11,106 $13,309 $19,618
M iddle  Pa ne l: Sky Trust  Carbon Charge  by Consumpt ion Ca tegory and Household Decile
Consumpt ion Categories
Food $39 $47 $53 $57 $61 $64 $68 $72 $80 $96
Beverages, tobacco $6 $7 $7 $8 $9 $9 $10 $11 $12 $17
Clothing $6 $8 $9 $9 $9 $10 $11 $14 $15 $27
Maintenance of dwell ings $397 $507 $595 $617 $680 $726 $791 $861 $970 $1,249
Housekeeping, household equipment  & $3 $4 $4 $5 $6 $6 $7 $9 $11 $14
Health, personal care $4 $6 $7 $9 $10 $11 $13 $14 $16 $21
Transportat ion, communicat ion $46 $82 $88 $105 $117 $119 $148 $178 $234 $374
Culture, recreat ion, entertainment $6 $8 $11 $11 $14 $15 $16 $21 $28 $50
Other expenditure $1 $3 $4 $4 $4 $5 $5 $7 $10 $16
Investment on housing $3 $3 $7 $3 $4 $5 $5 $8 $8 $18
Low er Pa ne l: Summary of  Sky Trust  Incidence
Total Sky  Trust  Carbon Charge -$507 -$672 -$779 -$826 -$912 -$964 -$1,068 -$1,185 -$1,377 -$1,865
11.6% 11.5% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% -11.1% -10.7% -10.3% -9.5%
-$63 -$180 -$372 -$859
0.7% -1.6% -2.8% -4.4%
Share of pre-Sky Trust  expenditure - - - - - -
Sky Trust  Div idend $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005 $1,005
Share of pre-Sky Trust  expenditure 23.0% 17.1% 14.4% 13.7% 12.3% 11.7% 10.5% 9.1% 7.6% 5.1%
Sky Trust  Net  Effect $498 $334 $227 $179 $93 $41
Share of pre-Sky Trust  expenditure 11.4% 5.7% 3.3% 2.4% 1.1% 0.5% -
11 
 
Notes
Sources: Top Panel is from Hungarian Central Stat ist ical Office 1996 Household Budget  Survey
with conversion from 1996 to 2006 prices with Hungarian CPI and to USD at  190 HUF/USD.
Middle and Lower Panels based on authors'  calcuat ions.
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